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The conclusion that foreign aid will promote economic growth only when allocated towards 
good policy regimes has been the subject of considerable debate.  Aid effectiveness 
researchers have variously sought to falsify this result or to find other individual conditions 
of aid effectiveness.  However, economic theory suggests that any factor which influences the 
expected returns to investment may influence the effect of aid on growth even when aid is 
partly diverted to consumption.  To investigate this hypothesis, “all” of the hypothesized 
conditions of aid effectiveness are individually tested in a cross-country growth specification.  
From these tests the most significant and robust individual interactions are simultaneously 
modeled, thereby deriving multiple conditions of aid effectiveness.  The paper concludes that 
aid is more effective in economies experiencing economic shocks or recovering from war, and 
less effective in countries which are geographically disadvantaged or at war.  We also find a 
previously unidentified condition of aid ineffectiveness: the inflow of foreign direct 
investment.  This finding renews a justified interest in the policy-aid-growth nexus, insofar as 
domestic policy determines the distribution of aid and FDI flows, which appear to act as 
substitutes in the growth process.  
 JEL Classification: F350, O111, O400 
Keywords: Foreign Aid. Economic Growth. Macroeconomic Policy. Institutional Quality. 
War. Geography. Macroeconomic Volatility. Foreign Direct Investment. 
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Introduction 
Towards the end of the 1990s, amidst a climate of aid fatigue on the part of donors and 
aid weariness on the part of recipients, a seminal work by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) – 
Aid, Policies and Growth - suggested that foreign aid could still promote economic growth 
provided it was directed towards “good policy” environments (open economies with low 
inflation and low budget deficits), a result obtained by virtue of a significant and positive 
aid*policy interaction term in a cross-country growth regression.  Though the finding was 
warmly received by many influential aid agencies
1, the Burnside and Dollar paper 
immediately sparked a heated debate in development circles, one which continues until this 
day and essentially constitutes the so called “Third Generation” of macroeconomic aid 
effectiveness studies (Hansen and Tarp, 2000).   
This Third Generation is comprised of two types of studies, summaries of which are 
provided in Tables A1 and A2 in our appendix.  In the first type (hereafter denoted 3G-1), 
researchers have directly tested the sensitivity of the Burnside and Dollar’s key result (the 
significance of an aid*policy interaction term) to variations in regressors, instruments, 
selection of outliers, changes in data, and even the pure updating of data (Dayton-Johnson and 
Hoddinott, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Hudson and Mosley, 2001; Dalgaard, Hansen and 
Tarp, 2002; Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2003; Roodman, 2003).  This literature has 
amply demonstrated the sensitivity of the Burnside and Dollar result, but has not positively 
added to our knowledge of the determinants of aid effectiveness. 
In contrast, researchers in the second type of Third Generation study (3G-2) have 
questioned whether good policy is the only condition of aid effectiveness, postulating that 
economic and political stability (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2001; Collier and Dehn, 2001; 
Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2002), geography (Dalgaard et al., 2002) and war (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002) might influence the effect of aid on economic growth.  Though this literature 
has been ripe with positive ideas, each author(s) has typically only tested their new condition 
against, at most, one other condition of aid effectiveness, Burnside and Dollar’s aid*policy 
interaction term.  Thus, as it stands, policy-makers have no means of knowing whether this 
list of conditions is exhaustive, nor whether they operate in tandem or reflect common causes.   
Our main objective here is to engage in a comprehensive Third Generation Type-2 study.  
Specifically, we postulate that economic theory suggests that the returns to aid will be 
influenced by any factor – economic, political, social or geographic – which affects the 
returns to investment (section I).  To test such a hypothesis we have constructed arguably the 
largest yearly cross-country panel data set heretofore employed in growth empirics of this 
type (section II), and separately tested for the significance of over 50 aid interaction terms 
















, 1 , 0             (1) 
in which growth in GDP per capita (g) is a function of initial income (y), domestic and 
foreign investment flows (i), foreign aid receipts (a), a vector of growth determinants (x) 
including macroeconomic, political, institutional and geographical variables, and an 
interaction between aid and z, the j
th hypothesized condition of aid effectiveness taken out of 
x.  However, in response to the 3G-1 studies, we test the sensitivity of our key findings to a 
number of methodological variations.  Finally, we test for the significance of the J significant 























, 1 , 0    (2) 
In doing so we derive an empirical estimate of “all” the measurable, robust and systematic 
conditions of effective aid which are justified by economic theory. 
Our results strongly suggest that aid effectiveness is largely determined by three 
previously identified factors - economic instability, geographical factors, the state of conflict 
(including post-war effects) – and one factor entirely new to the 3G literature – the level of 
foreign direct investment flows.  Our discussion section (Section IV) primarily focuses on this   5
new and complex result.  In particular, we discuss how our findings warrant greater 
consideration of private as well as public foreign financing for developing countries, 
especially the under-researched issue of whether aid substitutes or complements private 
foreign investment.  Section V concludes. 
 
1.  Theoretical Model 
1.1    Growth Theory 
Aid flows have typically been justified on the grounds that they augment savings and, 
therefore, investment.  For Burnside and Dollar (2000), aid effectiveness is a function of the 
productivity of this investment.  Foreign aid, however, comes in many different forms and is 
intended to promote growth in a variety of manners.  Arguably a more complete means of 
capturing the overall effects of aid is to let it enter a consumer’s budget.  However, the 
Ramsey (1929)-Cass (1965)-Koopmans (1965) model, in which savings is endogenous, 
typically shows that aid increases consumption one for one but has no effect on long run 
capital per worker and, by extension, long-run income (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001).  To 
amend this rather exaggerated result, Dalgaard and Hansen augment the standard model by 
letting producers operate in a risky environment in which they receive returns to investment 
with a probability, p, which is a function of consumption per capita, as per (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995).  Unlike other models of aid and growth in which aid flows may augment 
investment only, foreign aid may be effective in this model even when it is diverted to 
consumption, since higher consumption levels lead to greater social stability and, by 
extension, higher expected returns to investment (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). 
For the purposes of this study, the Dalgaard and Hansen augmentation of the Ramsey 
model is incomplete in that the probability of receiving returns is only  a function of 
consumption (c) and policy
2.  Instead, we let the probability of receiving returns (p) also be a 
function of any exogenous risk factor, x, including policy (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), the 
likelihood of expropriation or other losses to capital due to civil unrest (Collier and Hoeffler 
2002), exogenous shocks (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2001; Collier and Dehn, 2001), 
geographical factors (Dalgaard, Hansen et al., 2002), and demographic factors.  For simplicity 
of analysis, we let x denote variables which are positively correlated with p
3.  Formally: 
() x , c p p =            ( 3 )  
Defining such a function allows us to more realistically model expected profits (π), and 
therefore growth, as a function of a wide variety of economic, social, political and 
geographical conditions.  Expected profits are given by: 
(4)   () ( ) ( ) L t w t K t R L t K F t c p L K ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ), ( ), ( , − + − = δ π x      
where  () • F  is a standard output function of capital (K) and labor (L) (which reduces to f(k) in 
intensive form), R is the interest rate,δ is the depreciation rate, and w is the wage rate.  Since 
p is external to the individual firm, the standard optimization procedure implies that producers 
employ capital and labor until the expected marginal productivity of each factor equals the 
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We now let foreign aid (a) augment household consumption as per Dalgaard and Hansen
4.  
Households maximize the discounted utility (where ρ and σ  represent the subjective discount 
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subject to: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t c a t w t k t R t k − + + = &  and  ) 0 ( k given that  0 ) ( ≥ t k for all t    (8)   6
That is, the change in capital per worker (k) is the sum of capital income per worker, wages 
and aid transfers less consumption.  The present value Hamiltonian leads to the usual Keynes-
Ramsey rule
5. Using (5) and (6) and the intensive form of the production function we obtain: 
() ( ) [] ρ δ
σ
− − = ) ( ' ), (
1 ) (
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While substituting (6) into the budget constraint (8) yields: 
() ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) ( t k t c a t k f t c p t k δ − − + = x &        ( 1 0 )
  Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the augmented Ramsey model.   
 
[insert Figure 1] 
 
The first panel, taken from Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), shows that the key difference in 
this augmented formulation is that the  0 = c & curve slopes upwards and is only asymptotically 
vertical as p approaches unity.  This is due to the positive effect of consumption on the 
expected return to capital.   
In panel 2 an unanticipated permanent increase in aid results in the  0 = dt dk curve 
shifting upwards.  However, this marginal effect is determined by the change in p produced 
by a change in aid conditional upon risk factors, x.  Geometrically, these factors have an 
effect on the aid-growth transmission mechanism insofar as they determine the slope of the 
0 = c & curve.  Using the chain rule, this slope is given by: 
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Now suppose that a stability-related factor, x, increases.  By definition, p increases, but 












. That is, the responsiveness of p to aid-induced 
changes in consumption per capita is increased by x (i.e. aid and x are complements in 
producing higher returns to investment).  Equation (11) would then imply that any condition, 
x, which increases (decreases) p will steepen the  0 = c & curve and shift it right, such that the 
marginal effect of aid on growth is reduced (increased).  As an example, take the case of a 
transition from an autocratic to a democratic government.  One would hopefully expect that 
aid would be distributed in a less discriminatory manner in a democratic society. The p 
function in the democratic society is therefore more responsive to changes in consumption (as 
shown in panel 2 by the less vertical  0 = dt dc
D curve), relative to the autocratic society (the 
0 = dt dc
A  curve).  An equal increase in foreign aid produces greater capital accumulation in 
the democratic country (that is, 
A A D D k k k k 1 2 1 2 − > − ).   
In addition to the central implications of the model described above, several more general 
implications still hold form the Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) model.  First, foreign aid has a 
long-run effect on growth provided that it is directed towards risky environments (p<1), 
which implies, among other things, that aid will tend to be more effective in poorer (low 
consumption) countries (Gomanee et al., 2003).  And second, the upward sloping  0 = c & curve 
generates generic diminishing marginal returns to aid as p approaches unity (Hadjimichael, 
1995; Durbarry et al., 1998; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Lensink and White, 2001).  
The key innovation of this model, however, is that it encompasses all previous 3G-2 
studies by modeling a generic aid-growth transmission mechanism.  This mechanism leads to 
broad but empirically testable hypotheses about the influences of country-specific conditions. 
 
2.1  Structural Equations 
We now examine the implications of the Ramsey model for the modeling of economic 
growth.  Based on the representative producer’s profit equation (4), we model expected output 
as a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas formulation which now includes the level of 
technology, A, which was previously excluded for analytical simplification.:   7
α α − =
1
t t t t t L K A p Y           ( 1 2 )  
The intuition behind this model is that two countries with the same levels of factor inputs 
and technology could still, in a given year, have different levels of output if they have 
different levels of country-wide risk.
6  This model therefore explains a well-known stylized 
fact: the existence of the high-return but low-investment developing economy (Lucas 1990).   
In intensive notation this leads to (13)
7:  
α
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 Neither  p  nor  A is directly measurable, while data on capital per worker is not 
available for most developing countries.  We therefore proxy for the growth in the capital 

















1         ( 1 5 )  
where I represents total domestic and foreign investment flows.  However, because we do not 
any very accurate measures of the labor force at time t, we simply use total gross domestic 
and foreign direct investment flows in proportion to GDP
9.    
Accounting for growth in A and p is more imprecise, particularly as they may be a 
function of at least some of the same factors
10.   We have previously expressed p as a function 
of consumption per capita, which is partly financed by aid, and a host of exogenous factors, x.  
Since we do not have direct measures of consumption or income taxes, we employ foreign aid 
as an important determinant of changes in consumption per capita in conjunction with a host 
of indirect indicators of risk (e.g. distortionary policies, domestic conflict, external trade and 
geographical factors), the inclusion of which is guided by informal theory and previous 
growth research (See section III).   These factors also account for growth in technology, A, 
while a lagged output per capita term ( 1 − t y ) captures the distance from the steady state output 
level, and thus the well documented conditional convergence phenomenon.  
Thus far we have implicitly described a linear model.  However, the augmented Ramsey 
model suggests that: aid-augmented consumption will increase p conditional upon the 
relationship (complementarity or substitutability) between consumption and other factors 
which affect the returns to investment, x; there are diminishing marginal returns to aid; and 
that aid is more effective in riskier countries.  We test these with interaction terms between 
aid and z, where z may be either: an exogenous factor taken from x, foreign aid (such that we 
model aid-squared to test diminishing marginal returns), or one of two measures of the 
general risk level of the economy, income per capita and foreign direct investment.
11   A full 
list of our exogenous variables and their expected relationship to aid effectiveness is 
presented in Table A4 in our appendix. 
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Where
g
it ε is an error term capturing both measurement error and unaccounted for shocks, but 
which satisfy the normal OLS assumptions. 
Although we do employ (16), it is important to note that two important variables in this 
model may suffer from simultaneity bias: gross domestic investment and aid flows
12.   
The potential endogeneity of investment flows, and the difficulty in finding suitable 
instruments (Mankiw et al., 1992), has provided a justification for many aid studies, including 
Burnside and Dollar’s, to exclude investment from the growth equation.  A second reason is 
that the underlying theory of these studies generally suggests that aid is only effective insofar 
as it augments investment, which we may be a somewhat restrictive assumption
13.  However, 
in excluding investment or savings, a modeler runs the risk of inducing omitted variables bias.  
Given that there is no easy way to address the tradeoff between these simultaneity and   8
omitted variable biases, we run regressions of equation (16) with and without gross domestic 
investment flows. 
The other potentially endogenous variable - foreign aid - cannot be excluded from (16), 
though the availability of valid instruments for aid flows renders the issue far less 
problematic.  In particular, we let aid be determined by various measures of the benevolence 
of donors (captured by indicators of underdevelopment) as well as their strategic interests 
(captured by geopolitical indicators).  However, since aid is entered non-linearly into the 
growth equation, we also employ these instruments in a non-linear fashion as per Burnside 
and Dollar (2000)
14.  The preponderance of such instruments therefore renders our equations 
over-identified and therefore more consistent.  We also increase consistency by using 
continental dummy variables to derive our aid projections. 
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where    ≠
g x
a x , such that each equation is identified. 
Lastly, multicollinearity between the various exogenous components of x suggests that some 
of the conclusions drawn from testing rotations of (16) could be spurious.  Our final 
regression procedure therefore involves simultaneously testing the J significant conditions 























, 1 , 0        (16)’  
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
The data requirements of this study were demanding indeed.  Contrary to previous 3G 
studies, we sought to test any potential condition of aid’s effect on economic growth.  The 
recent empirical growth literature suggests a vast array of factors may fall into this category.  
Since our own analysis seeks to use panel data, as per previous 3G studies, we were required 
to collect what is probably the largest yearly data set ever employed in cross-country growth 
regressions.   
Additional challenges were posed on the methodological front.  A unique feature of the 
Third Generation Type-1 studies is the sharp disagreement over measurement and 
methodological issues such as the preferred measure of foreign aid, the construction of 
indices, model specification, and the treatment of outliers. 
 
 
2.1  The Data Set 
Since Burnside and Dollar (1997) the majority of Third Generation studies have 
employed four year averages rather than yearly data.  The key exceptions are Chauvet and 
Guillamont (2001) who effectively test volatility measures in twelve year periods, and 
Hudson and Mosley, who employ yearly data.  We employ four year averages in order to 
reduce the effects of measurement error, and because we expect that four year averages are 
sufficiently long to capture most volatility measures, but short enough so as not to completely 
dampen the medium run variation in our indicators.
15 
Data limitations restrict the dataset’s final dimensions to 56 countries and 76 variables for 
the years 1970 to 2001.  There are therefore eight four-year time periods, two more than were 
available to Burnside and Dollar.  A full list of the countries included in our sample can be 
found in Appendix Table A3 while our variable codes, their definitions, sources and 
hypothesized relationship to aid effectiveness is provided in Table A4.   9
Briefly, the variables in this study can be stratified into four categories: (1) 
macroeconomic policy measures
16; (2) political and institutional data, (3) indicators of war 
and the propensity for conflict; and (4) geographic and demographic data.  Suffice it to say, 
the great diversity and sheer quantity of variables reflects both the range of conditional 
effectiveness arguments put forth in Third Generation Type-2 studies, as well as the rapid 
advances in growth measurement and theory. 
Lastly, we employ Overseas Development Assistance over GDP (ODA) as our 
preferred foreign aid measure.   The Burnside and Dollar study departed from previous 
studies by choosing to employ Effective Development Assistance (EDA) data constructed by 
researchers at The World Bank (Chang et al., 1998). There are several controversies in both 
the original construction of the EDA data and in Burnside and Dollar’s use of the measure
17 
(Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Robrecht and Cassimon, 2001), but we need not resolve these 
controversies in order to reject the data for the simple reason that the EDA measure is not 
available beyond 1995 and before 1975.   
We also considered an alternative measure of aid which includes only those 
components of ODA directly intended to promote economic growth, including sectoral aid 
and program assistance, excluding items such as humanitarian and emergency aid.  This sort 
of measure was constructed and considered by Headey (2003) and more recently by Clemens, 
Radelet and Bhavani (2003).  However, the disaggregates required are only available in the 
form of commitments, not disbursements.  We were unwilling to take the Clemens et al. step 
of filling in pre-1990 data.  Furthermore, employing the more standard ODA measure renders 
our results more comparable to the majority of past research. 
 
2.2  A Comment on the Construction of Indices 
The construction of indices in growth regressions is often necessitated by the 
simultaneous objectives of capturing the effects of multiple variables whilst conserving 
degrees of freedom.  Nevertheless, Burnside and Dollar (and following in their footsteps, 
Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2001) constructed their “good policy index” in a highly 
controversial two-step procedure.  They first included their three good policy indicators – the 
inflation rate, the budget surplus and the Sachs-Warner openness index - in a growth 
regression which excludes foreign aid.  They then took the beta coefficients of these three 
variables and used them as weights in a good policy index, after which they re-entered the 
policy index into a similar growth regression, but one which included aid as well as aid 
interacted with policy. 
Other authors have criticized this procedure on several grounds, particularly Lensink and 
White (2000)
18.  Potentially the most serious problem has thus far been overlooked, however.  
By using the coefficients from the first growth regression, the policy index is essentially pre-
fitted to growth when it is re-entered into the second regression.  It is therefore possible that 
other variables in the second regression, particularly a newly entered variable such as foreign 
aid, are less likely to explain growth if they are at all correlated with the good policy index.  
Burnside and Dollar, then, may have artificially reduced the likelihood that aid entered 
separately will explain growth, but increased the chance that aid interacted with a pre-fitted 
policy index will be significant.  On this basis the conclusion that aid only works in a sound 
policy environment is potentially unsurprising.   
The lesson here seems to be that growth empiricists should be extremely wary of 
employing indices derived in this manner.  Furthermore, we suggest that failure to test 
interactions with the individual components of an index is also unrewarding, particularly if 
components vary in their causal relevance or statistical reliability
19.  In light of these 
concerns, we decided to form our own indices with arbitrary equal weights (though we do 
include both Burnside and Dollar’s and Chauvet and Guillaumont’s indices) and separately 
test the individual components of all our indices.   
   10
2.3  Econometric Methodology 
Our econometric methodology consists of four steps.  (1)  We first construct a base 
specification with a full list of growth determinants using OLS.  We select a number of 
popular indicators of growth from the literature (including the aid literature), and then reduce 
the model by removing insignificant variables.  (2)  In step 2 we add foreign aid and aid 
interactions to the base model and run both OLS and 2SLS regressions on all our interactions.  
These regressors are also applied to a low income sample.  (3)  Our next step is to add five 
additional sensitivity tests to those interactions which survive step (2), in order to address the 
methodological concerns raised in the 3G-2 literature.
20   (4)  Our final step is to 
simultaneously include all significant interactions in one regression. 
Our five sensitivity tests are as follows.   
First, in response to the problems associated with outliers and influential points in Third 
Generation Type-1 studies (see Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001, for example) we employ the well 
known Least Absolute Error (LAE) regressor
21.  The LAE estimator seeks to find the set of 
coefficients that minimizes the sum of absolute errors.  Of course, not all outliers are 
necessarily anomalous or bias-inducing.  Rather this test suggests that a more detailed 
analysis is warranted somewhere down the line.   
Second, we alter our base model to exclude domestic investment (GDI) on the grounds 
that it may be endogenous, which renders our specification closer to that of Burnside and 
Dollar and some other aid researchers.   
Third, we add aid-squared to the model, partly because there is a significant body of 
research which suggests that the existence of diminishing marginal returns to aid is both 
theoretically and empirically justified.,
22 but also because aid interaction terms and squared 
aid terms could be collinear or causally related. 
Fourth, we employ a simple fixed effects specification to take advantage of the panel data 
set.  Though we prefer to use specific indicators in order to identify some of the exact 
country-specific causes of growth, we nevertheless add continental dummies to the model as 
an additional specification test. 
Fifth and finally, we employ an entirely novel specification test in which we use a 
principal components reduction of all the exogenous factors in our general model.  This 
procedure, which is analogous to the rotational robustness tests of Sala-i-Martin (1997) and 
Levine and David Renelt (1992), applies a robustness test to the non-reduced factors 
(including the aid and aid-interaction terms), which could be correlated with any one of the 
variables within the components.  The elegance of this method is that the components 
themselves remain orthogonal to each other such that multicollinearity between the 




3.1  Base Regressions 
Our base model contains explanatory variables which are required to be included on 
strong theoretical grounds, such as investment flows and the convergence term, in addition to 
time dummies which are use to capture short run world business cycle effects (not reported).  
As to which variables should capture the technological and risk-related factors, we let the data 
decide subject to the general constraint that all our variables have been previously tested in 
the aid or growth literatures.  We adopt this method, rather than employ the Burnside and 
Dollar specification, because four of the twelve explanatory variables in their base regression 
were regularly insignificant, while it also did not include variables from the more recent aid 
and growth literatures, such as geographical factors, war variables
23, and the effects of 
economic shocks.  Our general model therefore incorporates not only the usual suspects from 
the empirical growth literature, but also variables employed by Chauvet and Guillaumont 
(2001), Dalgaard et al., (2002), and Collier and Hoeffler (2002), as well as aid flows.   
In fact, when we move to a more parsimonious model (Table 1, Regression 1), we find 
that many of the variables from the Burnside and Dollar base regression disappear
24, while 
several “conditions of aid effectiveness” from the aforementioned studies are generally highly   11
significant. These are: the proportion of land in the tropics (TROPLAND), the change in war 
intensity (∆WAR, a measure similar to Collier and Hoeffler’s), and the Chauvet and 
Guillaumont (2001) economic stability index (STABILITY).  Furthermore, two of Burnside 
and Dollar’s policy variables, LCPI and OPEN are significant, as is a good governance 
measure (GOV) from Knack and Keefer (1995), and our two investment measures, gross 
domestic and foreign direct investment (GDI and FDI).  Similar results hold for our low 
income sample (Regression 2).  Regressions 3 and 4 add aid (ODA) to the full and low 
income models, even though aid was included in our general specification and dropped in the 
reduction process.  We also test for the endogeneity of aid using a Hausman (1978) test: aid is 
apparently not endogenous in either sample.  Likewise we reject tests for overidentifying 
restrictions for a 2SLS version of our base model (not reported), which did not yield markedly 
different results from regressions 1 to 4.   
On the basis of these base regressions, it would appear that, unconditionally, foreign aid is 
ineffective in promoting economic growth.  However, we now come to the crux of our 
analysis, the empirical imposition of conditions of aid effectiveness.   12
 
[insert Table 1 - Base Regressions] 
 
3.2  Rotational Interactions 
We now turn to the crux of our analysis, the systematic testing of “all” potential 
conditions of aid effectiveness.  Tables A5 to A8 in our appendix present the results of 
running 50 such tests with variations in sample size (full or low income) and regressors (OLS 
















1 , 0            (1) 
In practice, however, we wish to avoid biasing our tests by including in the vector, x, any 
variable which is likely to be highly correlated with z
j.  Thus, when testing other measures of 
geographical disadvantage, economic instability, governance or conflict, we would remove 
TROPLAND, STABILITY, GOV and ∆WAR respectively. 
Due to space constraints, Tables A5 to A8 present beta-coefficients and heteroskedastic 
consistent t-values only for three variables from each regression: foreign aid (ODA), an 
interaction term between aid and the j
th hypothesized condition of aid effectiveness (a.z
j), and 
the j
th condition itself (z
j)
25.  These tables present results for all our major variations - OLS 
and 2SLS for the full sample and the low income sample.   We also include a column which 
denotes the expected sign of each term.  We do not report R-squared values, largely because 
these are quite uninformative, increasing slightly when interactions are significant and 
otherwise remaining at around 0.41.  Finally, since we are running an unbalanced panel, 
readers should be aware that sample sizes for each model are often not equal.  Full results are 
available on request. 
Though we leave the reader to peruse Tables A5 to A8 in our appendix at leisure, we offer 
Table 2 as a summary of these rotational tests.   
 
[insert Table 2 - Summary of Rotational Interactions Tests] 
 
The first two columns of Table 3 shows that of the 50 interactions tested, at least 28 of 
these were significant in one or more of the four variations.  On the one hand, an optimistic 
aid researcher might be encouraged by this result.  For a skeptic, however, this finding would 
tend to validate Roodman’s (2003) conclusion that statistical noise tends to drown out the 
signals about aid effectiveness, or alternatively, drown in spurious signals.  We attempt to 
reduce this noise by applying a survival of the fittest type approach.  We first use a simple 
empirical robustness check: column 3 shows the number of interactions which are significant 
on more than one occasion.  We are left with 17 slightly more robust interactions
26.   
This first elimination criterion removes several interesting results, however, including: the 
positive interaction between aid and a well-known proxy for the level of financial 
development, M2 money and quasi-money (Levine, 1997); negative interaction terms which 
include ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ETHNIC, a measure of the propensity for 
conflict) and war intensity (WAR); and a positive interaction with the Sub-Saharan Africa 
dummy variable (SSA). 
Secondly, we apply a theoretical robustness check by asking whether the significant 
interactions are all of the expected sign.  This robustness check relies on the soundness of our 
a priori expectations and our decision to ignore those results for which there are sign 
reversals.  Column 4 indicates that there are 5 interactions which pass this criterion.   
However, a host of interesting though somewhat inexplicable results are excluded by this 
criterion.  First, the Burnside and Dollar variables (though not their index) are rejected as all 
of them show indications of adversely influencing aid effectiveness, as per Hudson and 
Mosley (2002) and Chauvet and Guillaumont (2001), while two “bad policy” indicators, the 
black market premium on the exchange rate (BLACK) and arms expenditure over GDP 
(ARMS), would appear to increase aid effectiveness despite our hypothesis that these 
variables might capture the propensity for adverse Dutch Disease effects and fungibility,   13
respectively
27.  Second, a number of other measures of growth adversity - geographical, 
demographical and political – also appear to increase aid effectiveness.  These include 
variable such as age dependency ratios, illiteracy rates, the level of democracy and the Knack 
and Keefer measure of governance (GOV).   
Our final list of empirically and theoretically robust results is of particular interest.  Table 
4 presents the relevant terms from five consistently significant interactions which fulfilled our 
a priori hypotheses. 
 
[Insert Table 3 - Consistently significant interactions with expected signs] 
 
These results confirm a priori expectations that: 
1.  Foreign aid is less effective in high FDI countries, because aid and private foreign 
investment tend to act as substitutes in the growth process (Table A5, Appendix). 
2.  Aid is less effective in tropical countries (TROPLAND), as per Dalgaard et al., (2002).  
This result is perhaps weakened by the lack of supporting evidence from other 
indicators of geographical adversity, including a similar measure of the proportion of 
the population living in the tropics (TROPPOP).  Furthermore, the precise mechanism 
by which geography inhibits aid effectiveness (transport costs, lower human capital, 
lower agricultural productivity) is still not known (see Table A8). 
3.  Aid is less effective in economies with stable agricultural production (AGRICSTAB) or 
positive trends in their terms of trade (TOTTREND) as per Chauvet and Guillaumont 
(2001), though the former appears to be the more robust of the two (Table A7).  The 
converse conclusion would appear to be that aid is more particularly effective when it 
serves as insurance against production or price shocks.   
4.  Aid is both less effective in countries where there has been an increase in hostilities 
(∆WAR>0) and more effective in countries coming out of war (∆WAR<0).  Though 
this result is similar to Collier and Hoeffler (2002), their indicators are not significant in 
our samples.  This result only holds for 2SLS regressions (Table A6). 
5.  Aid appears to be generally less effective in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LATAM; Table A8, Appendix), though the generality of this result prevents us 
drawing more specific conclusions about the mechanism of this ineffectiveness.
28   
 
These results lend credence to the work of several prominent 3G-2 studies, with the 
exception of the negative interaction terms for both FDI and the LATAM dummy variable.  
For the remainder of the analysis, however, we drop the LATAM result on the grounds that it 
is a highly general condition of aid effectiveness, which, even if true, tells us very little about 
the causes of aid ineffectiveness in this region.  We therefore leave this result aside for future 
research 
 
3.3  Sensitivity Analysis 
We have already highlighted the widely expressed concern over the robustness of 
previous Third Generation results.  We now subject our own results to five types of sensitivity 
analyses as outlined in Section II, all of which are carried out with OLS regressions: a 
principal components (PC) reduction of our base specification, a Least Absolute Error  (LAE) 
regression of the six models, the removal of GDI, the inclusion of aid-squared, and a fixed 
effects (FE) (continental dummy variable) specification. 
Table 4 presents a summary of our results for the full sample only.  Readers should note 
that the PC test, which is incompatible with a 2SLS regressor, was not applied to the ∆WAR 
variable as it was only significant in 2SLS regressions.
29   
Our results are generally quite insensitive to the aforementioned variations.  In fact, only 
the ODA*AGRICSTAB and the ODA*∆WAR interactions lose significance under the LEA 
and fixed effects specifications, respectively
30.   However, the AGRICSTAB variable is 
purposely designed to capture the effects of outliers (i.e. shocks), such that the LEA test is not 
very meaningful for this interaction, while continental variations in ∆WAR no doubt induce   14
multicollinearity in the continental fixed effects regressions.  We also find that aid-squared is 
significant and negative only in the ∆WAR regression, perhaps suggesting that there are 
diminishing marginal returns to aid except when they are allocated to post-war countries in 
which the absorptive capacity of the economy is unusually high. 
 
[Insert Table 4 - Sensitivity Tests of Significant Findings] 
 
3.4 Simultaneous Conditions of Aid Effectiveness 
We now turn to the modeling of the four simultaneous conditions of aid effectiveness 
discussed above (see equation (2)) using both OLS and 2SLS.  Regressions 1, 2 and 3 in 
Table 5 show our OLS results. Regression 1 indicates that ODA*∆WAR is now highly 
significant (which was not the case with the individual interaction of ∆WAR), whereas 
ODA*FDI is now insignificant.   
We believe there are two explanations of this result.  The first is multicollinearity between 
these interactions.  If a cessation of conflict results in an increase in both FDI and aid flows 
then the post-war effectiveness of aid flows may not be lessened by the presence of FDI flows 
because the absorptive capacity of the post-war economy is abnormally and sufficiently high 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) to accommodate both flows. Mozambique in the 1990s is an 
example of just such an economy.  Secondly, the literature on the causes of civil war 
(Murdoch and Sandler 2001) suggests that the incidence of civil war is significantly higher in 
tropical countries, where, ceteris paribus, aid is generally less effective.  After controlling for 
aid’s  ineffectiveness in tropical countries, it may be unsurprising that the ODA*∆WAR 
interaction is strengthened in the OLS regressions. 
Regressions 2 and 3 experiment with dropping both ODA*FDI and ODA*∆WAR, 
respectively.  Without the presence of the other, each interaction is significant.  Regression 4, 
5 and 6 repeat this experiment with 2SLS.  In these regressions ODA*FDI is consistently 
insignificant.  It would appear, then, that the ODA*FDI result is sensitive to both the 2SLS 
regressor and the presence of the ODA*∆WAR interaction. 
 
[insert Table 5: Simultaneous Conditions of Aid Effectiveness] 
 
3.5  Marginal Effects of Aid on Growth 
Finally, we use the results from Table 5 to analyze the conditional marginal effects of aid 
on growth, though we first provide something of a disclaimer: we firmly believe that cross-
country regressions are an insufficient basis by which to make accurate quantitative 
inferences regarding aid effectiveness
31.   Furthermore, as the next section makes clear, 
assumptions regarding the causal relationships between aid and conditions of aid 
effectiveness are numerous, controversial, and for the moment at least, largely untested.   
Nevertheless, if one is willing to make a sufficiently large leap of faith, the findings above 
support a relatively pessimistic view of aid effectiveness, except in extenuating 
circumstances.   
Let us consider the derivative of growth with respect to aid from regressions 2 and 3 from 
Table 5, which exclude ∆WAR and FDI interactions respectively: 
WAR AGRICSTAB TROPLAND a
g ∆ − − − = ∂
∂ * 05 . 0 * 005 . 0 * 16 . 0 10 . 0    (18) 
FDI AGRICSTAB TROPLAND a
g * 01 . 0 * 004 . 0 * 12 . 0 11 . 0 − − − = ∂
∂    (19) 
Table 6 considers alternative evaluations of the marginal effects of aid on growth based 
on alternative assumptions and employing either (18) or (19), with the variation that we have 
standardized our agricultural stability measure. 
 
 
[Insert Table 6 - The marginal effects of aid on growth under various assumptions.]  
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In the first scenario we evaluate an “average country” - all conditions are set to their 
means (Scenario 1, Table 6).  Foreign aid is, in this “average country”, completely ineffective, 
with perhaps even mildly adverse effects on growth.  Scenario 2 considers a hypothetical 
African model: a country which receives no FDI, is fully tropical and has an above average 
volatility.  Again, the marginal effect on growth is virtually zero.   
Next, we exclude FDI from the model to analyze the effects of conflict.  Scenario 4 looks 
at the African model above under the onset of war (Scenario 3, Table 6).  Our results suggest 
that aid will tend to reduce growth in these countries.  In the post-war environment, however, 
an increase in aid of 1 percent will tend to increase growth by 0.139 percentage points 
(Scenario 4, Table 6).  Finally, we consider a non-tropical country in a post-war environment 
(Scenario 5, Table 6).  This is an almost ideal case in which aid is supra-effective, such that a 
1 percent increase in aid over GDP will increase growth by 0.292 percentage points.  This 
latter value falls roughly in the middle of Burnside and Dollar’s highest (0.47) and lowest 
estimates (0.11) of the impact of aid.   
 
4. Discussion 
4.1  Inferences 
Despite running close to 900 regressions, our study is less than fully comprehensive.  In 
particular, we have not tested variations in alternative aid measures; a wider range of non-
linear terms (such as additional quadratic terms for aid and interacted variables); an overtly 
dynamic model; and donor-specific factors
32.  With those general considerations in mind, it is 
pertinent to discuss what sort of reasonable inferences can be made regarding our 
determination of the significant conditions of aid effectiveness.   
 
Aid in the Tropics 
TROPLAND appears to be one of the more robust conditions of aid effectiveness, 
confirming the findings of Dalgaard et al., (2004) and Roodman (2004).  Dalgaard et al., 
argue that this result undermines Collier and Dollar’s (2002) justification for a selective 
approach to aid allocation based on policy performance: if aid ineffectiveness is due to 
geographical factors rather than poor policy, then donors can hardly punish countries with 
climate related hindrances to their development.  There are two problems with drawing this 
conclusion, however. 
First, our study, unlike those of Dalgaard et al and Roodman, does in fact question the 
robustness of the tropics-aid-growth relationship. This is because the key variable of interest, 
TROPLAND, was only one of eight comparable measures of geographical disadvantage, none 
of which produced even remotely significant results.  Of course, it may be that TROPLAND 
acts the most preferred natural index of aid ineffectiveness - one which captures the effects of 
higher health costs, lower labor productivity, lower soil productivity and higher transport 
costs (Dalgaard et al, 2002, Gallup et al., 1999).  But a second possibility is that the 
TROPLAND variable is not capturing the productivity of aid, but only its intention.   
Numerous authors, for example, have noted that a large proportion of foreign aid 
(humanitarian aid, emergency aid, and aid for long run development in health and education, 
for example) is not intended to increase growth.  Unsurprisingly, this sort of aid is heavily 
directed towards the tropical countries – countries with high incidences of disease, low levels 
of education, volatile climates and lower income per capita (Gallup et al, 1998).  Clemens et 
al (2004), for example, use an aid measure which removes these non-growth related forms of 
aid and find that aid effects growth unconditional on the tropical effect.  This certainly 
questions the validity of any policy conclusions that can drawn with respect to an aid-tropics-
growth relationship. 
 
Aid and War 
Turning to our second finding, that war decreases aid effectiveness while its cessation 
increases aid’s effect on growth, it is worth noting that our only consistently significant 
measure of conflict (∆WAR) differs significantly from the war and post-war dummy variables 
used by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) which we also tested in modified form (see tables A4 and   16
A6).  Our variable has the advantage that it simultaneously captures the adverse effects of the 
onset of war (∆WAR>0), and the beneficial effects of war’s cessation (∆WAR<0).  Ideally, 
however, we would prefer more precise measures of total battle deaths (which could be scaled 
according to the population size) as well as the geographical coverage of the war
33.  These 
measures would hopefully more accurately gauge the “physical” effect of war on economic 
activity.  Furthermore, our analysis was unable to establish differences between civil and 
external wars (see table A4). 
 
Aid and Economic Instability  
Roodman (2004) discusses some of the strengths and weaknesses of the various measures 
of economic volatility employed by Collier and Dehn (2001) and Chauvet and Guillaumont 
(2001).  Our own study, however, has uncovered that agricultural volatility appears to be 
driving the Chauvet and Guillaumont result, though we have also found evidence that aid has 
been effective in counterbalancing the effects of unfavorable long-run terms of trade 
movements
34.   More generally, the observed relationship between aid and the agricultural 
sector appears to justify closer inspection. 
 
Aid and FDI Flows  
The literature on the relationship between public and private financial flows to developing 
countries is small indeed.  A handful of analyses have looked at whether aid flows can or 
should act as a catalyst for foreign investment (Bauer 1976; Clemens 2002; Dapice 2002), 
while the converse FDI-effectiveness literature has, to our knowledge, not yet considered the 
role of aid flows to FDI recipients.  If aid flows do affect FDI flows or vice-versa, or if FDI 
flows are endogenous to growth (a likely possibility), then at the very least our structural 
equations for growth (16) and aid flows (17) need to be augmented by an FDI equation.   
Setting aside these possibilities for the moment, one can identify three types of 
relationships between aid, FDI and growth which are consistent with the negative ODA*FDI 
interaction term: our a priori position, that FDI might reduce aid effectiveness; a converse 
conclusion, that aid reduces FDI effectiveness (analogous to White’s (2001) critique of the 
Burnside and Dollar aid-policy interaction);  or, nesting these two, aid and FDI flows are 
broadly symmetric substitutes in that the presence of one systematically reduces the 
effectiveness of the other.   
Post priori, which interpretation is the most appealing?  The common characteristic of aid 
and FDI flows, and therefore their superficial degree of substitutability, is that they both may 
augment the capital stock.  They differ significantly, however, in their response to market 
failures.  Neoclassical growth theory, which typically abstracts from market failures, suggests 
that FDI should flow from rich countries to poor countries because of the higher rate of return 
in the latter.  The paradox famously raised by Lucas (1990) is ‘Why is this not the case?’  
Lucas considers several possibilities - human capital differentials and political risk – and one 
could add a third, limited information.  In many ways, though, these are interconnected 
explanations, all of which probably play some role in the high return-low investment paradox. 
Let us include them all under the general heading, risk. 
To analyze the relationship between aid, FDI and risk, imagine two developing countries, 
both with savings constraints, and both with high pre-risk returns to investment.  Let us 
assume that foreign investment and aid are perfect substitutes in terms of the provision of 
capital, and let one country be low risk (that is, a high probability of receiving returns 
country), and the second high risk.   
In the first economy there are no significant market or government failures which affect 
investment risk, so private investors allocate funds to the highest expected return investments.  
Thus, unless aid crowds out private investment, which presumably affects the level of FDI 
more so than its average rate of return, aid can only be allocated to relatively low return 
projects or consumption (Bauer, 1974)
35; aid is therefore ineffective in this low risk-high FDI 
country.   
In the high risk country, foreign private investment is low because expected returns are 
low.  Expected returns to foreign aid are also low unless aid donors face a different level of   17
risk than private foreign investors do.  In this sense, aid donors may in fact have a 
comparative advantage in high risk countries due to greater access to information (e.g. 
previous research and data collection), higher levels of human capital (e.g. technical 
assistance), their ability to target funds towards governance strengthening and conflict 
resolution, and their somewhat more debatable capacity to affect recipient government 
policies (i.e. conditionalities).  Furthermore, donors can direct funds towards projects in 
which part of the risk faced by private investors concerns their ability to extract all the returns 
(that is, projects with large positive externalities).  An important auxiliary conclusion is that if 
donors can reduce risks in the short run, they may also be able to affect long run risk and 
thereby catalyze private investment flows, which in fact is one of the original rationales for 
foreign aid (Clemens, 2002). We leave this important issue to further research. 
 
4.2  Aid Allocation 
Previous aid effectiveness research has been used to justify a selectivity approach which 
argues that aid should be reallocated towards countries in which the conditions of aid 
effectiveness are in place (World Bank, 1998; Collier and Dollar, 2002).  One significant 
criticism of this approach – indeed, the very rationale of 3G-2 research - was that all the 
conditions of aid effectiveness were not identified by Burnside and Dollar and Collier and 
Dollar.  On the basis of previous 3G-2 work, this study has uncovered three previously 
identified conditions of aid effectiveness, and augmented this list with an important new 
condition, the level of FDI flows.  It could therefore be argued that our results are seemingly 
amenable to the formation of an improved selectivity decision rule.  Nonetheless, we do not 
believe this is the case, for reasons outlined below. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in implementing a four-pronged selectivity rule is that, 
unlike ‘good policy’, our four conditions of aid effectiveness cannot neatly be categorized as 
endogenous in the sense that they are within the recipient governments’ control.  Our 
conditions range from being almost strictly exogenous (geography), to semi-endogenous 
(volatility of agricultural production), to something closer to being directly in the control of 
recipient government policy (war, FDI).  Therefore the moral justification of allocating aid on 
an efficiency basis alone - that is, that recipient governments are solely responsible for aid 
inefficiencies - is largely removed.   
However, our very ability to accurately gauge aid efficiency with macroeconomic 
regression analysis also has to be questioned.  First, econometric tests can rarely settle issues 
of causality to the theoretician’s satisfaction, such that the exact causal relationships between 
aid, growth and our four conditions of aid effectiveness may always be largely unknown.  But 
beyond statistical tests of historical data, the selectivity approach relies on a presumption that 
donor behavior, as well as aid flows themselves, cannot directly or indirectly influence the 
efficiency of aid flows, a proposition which has been called into question by various aid 
experts (Mosley and Hudson, 2002; Roland-Holst and Tarp, 2002).  Thus the selectivity 
approach envisages a static and narrow conception of the role of aid agencies, one which 
ironically renders the most legitimate rationale for aid - its potential to overcome the types of 
failures which cause low levels of investment - largely obsolete. One hopes, then, that our 
empirical findings will be used for some more creative thought as to how donors can 
successfully influence the obstacles to aid’s ineffectiveness, rather as a basis for redirecting 




This study has carried out an extensive investigation of the conditions of aid 
effectiveness, though it has certainly opened as many doors as it has closed.  Empirical results 
broadly confirm several prominent findings from previous Third Generation studies and also 
suggest that aid effectiveness is adversely affected by the level of foreign direct investment. 
Though no evidence was found that good policies directly promote aid effectiveness, this 
study indirectly imposes the need to reconsider the role of policies in the aid-growth 
relationship, in that investor-favorable policies almost certainly play a vital role in   18
determining the size of FDI flows and, therefore, the degree to which aid will be necessary 
and effective.  Future research should not only consider the extent to which aid can catalyze 
or complement private foreign investment flows, but also the potential for donors to 
successfully influence the other obstacles to effective foreign aid.    19
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Table 1 - Base Regressions 






Regressor  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
N    419 294 419 294 
              
LGDP  -0.55** -0.60** -0.67** -0.57** 
    (2.69) (2.24) (2.01) (2.16) 
GDI  0.13** 0.14** 0.14** 0.13** 
    (4.08) (3.75) (3.77) (4.08) 
FDI  0.39** 0.36** 0.37** 0.39** 
    (4.69) (3.50) (3.54) (4.67) 
LCPI  -1.45** -1.47** -1.45** -1.44** 
    (3.91) (3.59) (3.43) (3.82) 
OPEN  1.89** 1.97** 1.97** 1.89** 
    (4.89) (4.24) (4.25) (4.87) 
STABILITY  7.45** 7.47** 7.12** 7.35** 
    (3.09) (2.84) (2.54) (2.88) 
TROPLAND  -1.80** -1.77** -1.79** -1.80** 
    (4.58) (3.15) (3.18) (4.61) 
∆WAR -0.35  -0.59**  -0.61**  -0.35 
    (1.58) (2.11) (2.10) (1.56) 
GOV  0.29** 0.26** 0.27** 0.29** 
    (2.99) (2.54) (2.55) (2.98) 
ODA --  --  -0.009  -0.003 
       (0.36)  (0.13) 
CONSTANT 4.07** 4.56** 5.07** 4.23** 
    (2.62) (2.31) (2.08) (2.15) 
R
2  0.40 0.43 0.40 0.43 
Ra
2  0.39 0.41 0.39 0.41 
 
Hausman test for exogeneity of foreign aid 
t(eoda) --  --  0.058  -0.18 
 
Test for overidentifying restrictions 
2
q χ      0.08  0.14 
Notes: White heteroskedastic-consistent t-values are in parentheses. 
*       Significant at 10% level 
**     Significant at 5% level 
***   Significant at 1% level 
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 Table 2 - Summary of Rotational Interactions Tests 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Criterion None  Significant  at  10% 
level at least once 
Significant at 10% 
level at least twice 




50 28 17 5 
   22















n  β  t  β  t  β  t  β  t 
ODA    0.027 0.97  0.021 0.68  -0.022 0.83  -0.040 1.42 
Interaction  -  -0.016 2.61** -0.015 2.20** -0.020  1.73*  -0.021  1.58 
FDI  +  0.495 5.36**  0.501 4.19**  0.577  5.06** 0.592  4.01** 
ODA    0.117 1.68* 0.088 1.09  -0.004 0.13  -0.019 0.63 
Interaction  -  -0.140 1.90*  -0.113 1.32  -0.123  2.59**  -0.140  2.40** 
TROPLAND  -  -1.309 3.06** -1.304 2.05** -1.828  4.73**  -2.092  3.82** 
ODA    0.021 0.85  0.018 0.67  -0.032 1.20  -0.055 1.84* 
Interaction  ?  -0.104 2.87** -0.124 3.17** -0.090  1.85*  -0.133  2.48** 
LATAM  ?  1.339 3.04**  2.063 3.80**  0.930  2.15*  1.586  2.89** 
ODA    -0.015 0.65  -0.014 0.57  -0.048  1.96**  -0.059  2.28** 




0.037 2.85**  0.039 1.55  0.027  3.05** 0.023  2.08** 
ODA    -0.016 0.58  -0.013 0.41  -0.041  1.48  -0.058  1.93 
Interaction  -  -0.026 1.50  -0.020 1.02  -0.069  2.12**  -0.074  2.20** 
∆WAR  -  -0.176 0.70  -0.513 1.57  -0.008  0.33  -0.237  0.76 
Notes: White heteroskedastic-consistent t-values are in parentheses. 
*       Significant at 10% level 
**     Significant at 5% level 
***   Significant at 1% level 
#Instruments include DEMOC, SCHOOL, TROPLAND, RURAL, AGEDEP, FRENCH, SCHOOL2, 
MORTALITY, ARMS, POSTWAR, MILITARY, POP2, MORT2, POP*MORTALITY.   23
Table 4 - Sensitivity Tests of Significant Findings 
Tests: PC  LAE  No  GDI  ODA
2 FE 
       
ODA  0.045*  0.016 0.038 0.024 0.048* 
  1.85 0.56 1.32 0.41 1.65 
ODA*FDI  -0.020** -0.015*  -0.012** -0.016** -0.019** 
  3.19 1.83 2.01 2.63 2.84 
FDI  0.42** 0.37** 0.55** 0.50** 0.15** 
  4.54 3.39 5.45 5.36 4.68 
ODA
2     0.000   
     0.08   
ODA  0.208** 0.186** 0.176** 0.100  0.190** 
  2.73 2.98 2.66 1.25 3.03 
ODA*TROPLAND  -0.215** -0.214** -0.189** -0.147** -0.207** 
  2.72 3.13 2.67 2.01 3.13 
TROPLAND  -1.33** -0.92** -1.21** -1.30** -2.36** 
  2.92 2.07 2.86 3.04 4.14 
ODA
2     0.001   
     0.60   
ODA  0.032  -0.043*  -0.001 -0.040 0.002 
  1.24 1.86 0.06 0.80 0.10 
ODA*AGRICSTAB  -0.005** -0.003  -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
  3.09 1.17 2.13 2.59 2.00 
AGRICSTAB  0.046** 0.030  0.038** 0.040** 0.029** 
  3.39 1.55 2.62 3.26 2.22 
ODA
2     0.001   
     1.02   
ODA
#  --  -0.150**  -0.077 -0.061 -0.037 
    3.60 1.64 1.31 0.79 
ODA*∆WAR  --  -0.116** -0.068** -0.076** -0.060 
    2.91 2.01 2.30 1.58 
∆WAR  --  -0.17 0.01  -0.01 -0.05 
    0.63 0.06 0.06 0.22 
ODA
2  --    -0.001*   
     1.94   
Notes: White heteroskedastic-consistent t-values are in parentheses. 
*       Significant at 10% level 
**     Significant at 5% level 
***   Significant at 1% level   24
Table 5: Simultaneous Conditions of Aid Effectiveness 
Regression  1 2 3 4 5 6 
N  420 420 420 374 374 374 
            
LGDP  -0.90** -0.79** -0.89** -1.26** -1.23** -1.26** 
    (3.52) (3.14) (3.50) (4.17) (4.02) (4.16) 
GDI  0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 
    (4.22) (4.21) (4.18) (4.79) (4.65) (4.80) 
FDI  0.43** 0.43** 0.38** 0.57** 0.46** 0.55** 
    (4.56) (4.53) (4.77) (5.04) (5.23) (4.90) 
LCPI  -1.39** -1.23** -1.43** -0.81** -0.87** -0.72** 
    (3.46) (3.02) (3.58) (2.49) (2.91) (2.09) 
OPEN  1.70** 1.69** 1.68*  2.06** 2.06** 2.09** 
    (4.44) (4.39) (4.39) (5.57) (5.58) (5.62) 
TROPLAND  -1.55** -1.61** -1.47** -1.63** -1.58** -1.63** 
    (3.75) (3.86) (3.57) (3.95) (3.81) (3.89) 
AGRICSTAB  0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
    (3.17) (2.81) (3.28) (3.29) (3.48) (3.42) 
∆WAR  -0.02 -0.32 -0.02**  0.08  0.04  -0.17 
    (0.08) (1.38) (0.08) (0.35) (0.17) (0.74) 
ICRG  0.29** 0.29** 0.30** 0.23** 0.24** 0.23** 
    (2.86) (2.83) (2.97) (2.44) (2.50) (2.37) 
ODA  0.11 0.11 0.10**  0.09 0.08 0.10 
    (1.51) (1.61) (1.45) (1.26) (1.04) (1.27) 
ODA*FDI  -0.01 -0.01*  --  -0.02 --  -0.01 
    (1.33) (1.74)   (1.31)   (1.22) 
ODA*TROPLAND -0.14* -0.12* -0.16** -0.19** -0.20** -0.19** 
    (1.93) (1.67) (2.18) (2.79) (2.92) (2.77) 
ODA*AGRICSTAB  -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
    (3.50) (2.75) (3.64) (3.14) (3.22) (3.01) 
ODA*∆WAR  -0.05** --  -0.05** -0.07** -0.06**   -- 
    (3.11)   (3.52) (2.05) (2.03)    
CONSTANT  6.43** 5.70** 6.45** 10.01**  9.92** 10.02** 
    (3.35) (3.00) (3.36) (4.20) (4.11) (4.20) 
R-SQUARE  0.42 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.43 
    0.39 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Notes: White heteroskedastic-consistent t-values are in parentheses. 
*       Significant at 10% level 
**     Significant at 5% level 
***   Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6 - The marginal effects of aid on growth under various assumptions. 
















































-0.167 0.135  0.292 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1 - Aid-Policy Interactions & Sensitivity Results from Third Generation Type-1 Studies 
Authors Conclusion 
Burnside & Dollar  
(1997, 2000) 
Aid is effective in sound macroeconomic policy environments. 
Dayton-Johnson & Hoddinott 
(2003) 
aid raises growth only in the presence of a good policy environment in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  Outside SSA aid raises growth 
independent of policy; 
Hansen and Tarp (2000a, 
2000b)  
Burnside and Dollar result not robust to: alternative specifications, 
including aid-squared; and alternative estimators (GMM).  Authors use 
their own data.  
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001)  Burnside and Dollar result not robust to alternative selection of 
outliers, even with Burnside and Dollar data.  Aid-squared is preferred 
non-linear term.  Results are highly instrument-dependent. 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman 
(2003) 
An updating of the Burnside and Dollar data and application of 
Burnside and Dollar methodology cannot replicate original Burnside 
and Dollar results. 
Roodman (2003)  Burnside and Dollar result is sensitive to alternative aid and policy 
measures, lengths of time periods, specifications and regressors. 
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Table A2:  Alternative Conditions of Aid Effectiveness from Third Generation Studies Type-2 Studies 
Authors Conclusion 
Hadjimichael (1995);  
Durbarry et al., (1998) 
Lensink and White (2001); 
Hansen et al., (2000, 2001) 
Aid effectiveness decreases with the level of aid such that there are 
diminishing marginal returns to aid. 
Gomanee (2003)  Aid tends to increase pro-poor expenditure (PPE) in low income 
countries 
Guillaumont & Chauvet (2001, 
2002) 
Aid is more effective in countries experiencing trade and production 
shocks (economic instability), but less effect in political unstable 
environments. 
Collier & Dehn (2001)  Aid is more effective in countries experiencing export shocks 
(economic instability). 
Collier & Hoeffler (2002)  Aid is more effective in post-conflict societies. 
Dalgaard et al., (2002)   Aid is more effective in non-tropical countries. 
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Table A3 – List of Countries 
Asia  Sub-Saharan Africa  Latin America & Caribbean 
    




Botswana   Mali   Bolivia   Haiti  East Asia Algeria   
Burkina Faso   Mozambique   Dominican 
Rep.  Honduras 
Indonesia   Egypt 
Cote d'Ivoire   Niger   Ecuador  Nicaragua  PNG Jordan   
Congo, Rep.  Nigeria  El Salvador 
Paraguay 
Philippines   Morocco  
Cameroon   Senegal  Argentina*  Mexico *  Thailand   Tunisia  
Congo, DR.  Sierra Leone   Brazil *  Panama *  Malaysia *  Syria* 
Ethiopia   Tanzania   Chile *  Peru *    Turkey * 
Gambia  Togo   Costa Rica*   Trinidad & 
Tobago* 
  
Ghana   Uganda   Colombia *  Uruguay*   South Asia   
Kenya   Zambia Guatemala  *  Venezuela*   Bangladesh    
Madagascar  Zimbabwe Jamaica  *    Sri Lanka    
Malawi      Pakistan     
Gabon*       India    
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Table A4 – Variable codes, definitions and hypothesized relationship to aid effectiveness 




Change in ODA     n.a. 
ARMS  Arms imports over total imports.   US Department of 
State, Various Years. 
-ve (poor 
governance) 
BLACK  Black Market Premium (%; 0 
means zero) 
Global Development 
Finance & WDI 
-ve (poor policy 
conditions) 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment over 
GDP 
WDI  -ve (aid and FDI are 
growth substitutes) 
GDI  Gross domestic investment over 
GDP 
WDI n.a. 
GROWTH  GDP per capita growth (annual %)  WDI  n.a. 
LCPI  The natural log of the Consumer 
price index (1995 = 100) plus one 
WDI -ve  (poor  policy 
environment) 




-ve (aid is more 
effective in poor 
countries) 
M2  Money and quasi money (M2) as 
% of GDP, lagged one period. 
WDI +ve  (good  policy 
conditions) 
ODA  Aid percentage of Gross National 
Product  
OECD DAC Creditor 
Reporting System 
 n.a. 
OPEN  Open economy=1, closed =0.   Sachs and Warner 
(1995); Roodman 
(2003); Wacziarg and 
Welch  (2002). 
+ve (good policy 
environment) 
POLICY  Burnside and Dollar good policy 
index = 1.28 + 6.85*SURP –   
1.40*INFL + 2.16*OPEN 
Burnside & Dollar 
(2000) 
+ve (good policy 
conditions) 
SURP  Budget surplus/deficit over GDP  International 
Financial Statistics, 
WDI.  
+ve (good policy 
environment) 
TRADE  Total trade (imports+exports) over 
GDP                  
WDI +ve  (good  policy 
environment) 
∆WAR  Change in war intensity (WAR)      -ve & +ve (poor 
governance in war 
high returns post-
war) 
ARMY  Size of military/population  Arthur S. Banks   -ve (poor 
governance) 
ASSAS  Number of assassinations: Any 
politically motivated murder or 
attempted murder of a  
high government official or 
politician. 
Arthur S. Banks   -ve (poor 
governance) 
BUREAUC Bureaucratic  quality  (0 to 6)  PRS Group’s IRIS III 




COUPS  Coups d'etat dummy variable  Arthur S. Banks 
Cross National Time-
Series Data Archive 
-ve (poor 
governance) 
DEMOC  Democracy score 1-10  POLITY IV   +ve (good 
governance) 
CIVWAR  A dummy variable for incidence of 
civil war, large populations (>50m) 
Collier and Hoeffler 
(2002), with 
-ve (poor 
governance)   30
excluded. extensions. 
DURABLE  Years since conception of 
independent autonomous state. 
POLITY IV   +ve (good 
governance) 
ETHNIC  Probability that two individuals 
will belong to different ethnic 
groups. 
Easterly 1992     -ve (poor 
governance) 
ETHTENSE  Ethnic tensions (1 to 10)  PRS Group’s IRIS III 




EXPROP  Expropriation risk (1 to 10)  PRS Group’s IRIS III 




GOV3  Equally weighted average of 
HONEST,  LAW & BUREAUC 
 +ve  (good 
governance) 
HONEST  Corruption in government (0 to 6)  PRS Group’s IRIS III 




LAW  Rule of law (law and order 
tradition) 
PRS Group’s IRIS III 
data set (see Knack 
and Keefer 1995) 
+ve (good 
governance) 
PCWAR  Post civil war dummy variable.  
Effectively the period of peace 
onset. 
Collier and Hoeffler 
(2002) with 
extensions. 
+ve (high returns to 
aid) 
PCONF  Simple average of assassinations 
and coups per year lagged one 
period. 
Roodman (2003); 
underlying data from 
Arthur S. Banks. 
-ve (poor 
governance) 
REPUD  Repudiation of government 
contracts 
PRS Group’s IRIS III 
data set (see Knack 
and Keefer 1995) 
+ve (good 
governance) 
REV  Revolutions  Arthur S. Banks   -ve (poor 
governance) 
WAR   War Intensity  PRIO (2003)  -ve (poor 
governance) 
PSHOCK  -ve % price index changes, 
threshold country-specific as shares 
of GDP. Reconstructed based on 
underlying index data for 1957–97. 
From Collier and 
Dehn (2002) with 
updates from 
Roodman (2003) 
+ve (aid buffers 
shocks) 
AGRICSTAB  Stability in agricultural value 
added = reciprocal of deviations 
from time trend. 
Chauvet and 
Guillaumont (2001).   
-ve (aid buffers 
shocks) 
EXPORTSTAB  stability in exports =reciprocal of 
deviations from time trend. 
Chauvet and 
Guillaumont (2001).   
-ve (aid buffers 
shocks) 
NSHOCK  -ve % price index changes, 
threshold country-specific as shares 
of GDP. Reconstructed based on 
underlying index data for 1957–97. 
From Collier and 
Dehn (2001) with 
updates from 
Roodman (2003) 
+ve (aid buffers 
shocks) 




-ve (aid buffers 
shocks) 




2001).   
-ve (aid buffers 
shocks) 
AGEDEP  Age dependency: ratio of less than 
15yrs and over 65 yrs to working 
age. 
WDI  -ve (cost of aid) 
CENTAM  dummy variable for Central 
America 
 n.a. 
CIFFOB The  C.I.F./F.O.B. ratio of transport 
from capital city to  Baltimore in 
IMF  -ve (cost of aid)   31
1995 
EASIA  East Asia dummy  WDI  No expectations 
EGYPT  Dummy variable for Egypt     n.a. 
FRZ  Dummy variable for Franc Zone  Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) 
n.a. 
GEOIND  Equally weighted index of 
RURAL, TROPLAND and 
INLAND 
  -ve (cost of aid) 
ILLIT  Illiteracy rate, adult total (% of 
people ages 15 and above) 
WDI  -ve (cost of aid) 
INLAND  Proportion of land not within 
100km within coast 
 Harvard University 
CID 
-ve (cost of aid) 
ISOLATED  Distance from economic core 
(Europe, Japan, USA) 
Harvard University 
CID 
-ve (cost of aid) 
LATAM  Latin America dummy WDI  No  expectations 
LIFE  Life expectancy at birth, total 
(years)  
WDI  -ve (cost of aid) 
LPOP  Log of the population.  WDI    
MAL66  % of 1995 population living in 
areas with malaria, 1966 
Harvard University 
CID 
-ve (cost of aid) 
MORT  Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 
live births)  
WDI  -ve (cost of aid) 
RURAL  Rural population (% of total 
population) 
WDI  -ve (cost of aid) 
SASIA  south asia dummy variable WDI  No  expectations 
SCHOOL  School enrollment, primary (% 
gross)  
WDI  -ve (cost of aid) 
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  WDI  No expectations 
TROPLAND  Percentage of land in the tropics.  Harvard University 
CID 
-ve (cost of aid) 
TROPPOP  Percentage of population  which is 
in  tropics 
 Harvard University 
CID 
-ve (cost of aid) 
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Table A5 - Aid interactions with Policy Indicators 
OLS, Full Sample  OLS, Low Income  2SLS, Full Sample  2SLS, Low Income 
Variables 
Exp. 
Sign  β  t   β  t  β  t  β  t 
ODA  +  -0.003 0.13  -0.009  0.36  -0.056  1.20  -0.056  1.20 
ODA  +  -0.002 0.04  -0.054  0.84  -0.016  0.50  -0.032  0.97 
ODA
2  -  0.000 0.02  0.001  0.95  -0.002 1.14  -0.002 1.03 
ODA  ?  -0.001 0.05  -0.023  0.68  -0.013  0.43  -0.031  0.97 
Interaction  +  -0.012 1.25  -0.014  1.31  -0.020  1.51  -0.022  1.38 
POLICY  +  0.954 5.70**  0.991  5.20**  1.030  6.53**  1.073  5.43** 
ODA  ?  0.016 0.60  0.019  0.61  -0.024 0.91  -0.037 1.30 
Interaction  +  -0.044 1.31  -0.058  1.60  -0.063  1.67*  -0.083  1.80* 
OPEN  +  2.148 4.90**  2.341  4.40**  2.553  5.84**  2.902  5.21** 
ODA  ?  0.001 0.03  -0.005 0.19  -0.030 1.08  -0.044 1.52 
Interaction  +  -0.011 0.55  -0.011  0.51  -0.037  1.10  -0.048  1.36 
LCPI  +  -1.368 3.17  -1.375  2.75** -0.900  2.36  -0.810  1.80 
ODA  ?  -0.069 1.84  -0.098  2.22** -0.021  0.65    -0.041 1.24 
Interaction  +  -1.031 2.00** -1.131  1.50  -0.260  0.48  -0.256  0.39 
SURP  +  14.64 2.80**  13.623  2.09**  12.411  2.20**  12.81  1.83* 
ODA  ?  -0.01 0.50  -0.022  0.75  -0.04  1.51  -0.06  2.02 
Interaction  -  0.02 3.25**  0.02  3.19**  0.04  2.38**  0.04  2.03** 
BLACK  -  -0.28 3.25**  -0.29  3.15**  -0.60  2.48**  -0.58  2.13** 
ODA  ?  0.052 1.00  0.039  0.69  -0.023 0.77  -0.040 1.21 
Interaction  +  -0.001 0.91  0.000  0.63  0.000  0.80  0.000  0.12 
TRADE  +  -0.015 2.31** -0.014  1.93*  -0.009  1.49** -0.007  0.97 
ODA    -0.074 1.44  -0.113  1.99** -0.028  1.02  -0.046  1.58 
Interaction  +  0.003 1.55  0.004  1.94*  -0.001 0.57  0.000  0.09 
M2  +  -0.052 3.88** -0.068  4.25** -0.029  2.49** -0.041  2.58** 
ODA    0.080 0.31  0.373  1.18  -0.022 0.81  -0.036 1.20 
Interaction  ?  -0.012 0.31  -0.055  1.18  -0.007  1.20  -0.011  1.46 
LGDP  -  -0.531 1.91*  -0.459  1.21  -0.946  2.58** -1.235  2.63** 
ODA    0.027 0.97  0.021  0.68  -0.022 0.83  -0.040 1.42 
Interaction  -  -0.016 2.61** -0.015  2.20** -0.020  1.73*  -0.021  1.58 
FDI  +  0.495 5.36**  0.501  4.19**  0.577  5.06**  0.592  4.01** 
ODA    -0.009 0.38  -0.048  1.70*  -0.039  1.58  -0.048  1.70* 
Interaction  -  0.040 1.06  0.02  0.33  0.003  0.55  0.022  0.33 
ARMY  -  -0.373 0.80  -0.39  0.61  0.539  1.22  -0.387  0.61 
ODA    -0.039 1.39  -0.054  1.66*  -0.051  1.83*  -0.061  1.90* 
Interaction  -  0.163 1.22  0.285  1.78*  0.202  0.69  0.431  1.04 
ARMS  -  -0.795 0.28  -6.400  1.35  0.404  0.99  -4.474  0.76 
Notes: White heteroskedastic-consistent t-values are in parentheses. 
*       Significant at 10% level 
**     Significant at 5% level 
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Income  Variables 
Exp. 
Sign 
β  t  β  t  β  t  β  t 
ODA    -0.011 0.42  0.000  0.37  -0.026 0.93  -0.044  1.47 
Interaction  -  0.023 1.20  0.008 0.40  0.001 0.04  -0.069 1.71* 
WAR  -  0.281 1.80  0.389 2.13**  0.225 1.33  0.420  1.94 
ODA    -0.016 0.58  -0.013 0.41  -0.041 1.48  -0.058  1.93 
Interaction  -  -0.026 1.50  -0.020 1.02  -0.069 2.12** -0.074  2.20** 
∆WAR  -  -0.176 0.70  -0.513 1.57  -0.008 0.33  -0.237  0.76 
ODA    -0.012 0.46  -0.007 0.26  -0.030 1.10  -0.045  1.50 
Interaction  -  0.058 1.16  0.048 1.00  0.019 0.26  -0.049 0.53 
CIVWAR  -  0.288 0.75  0.398 0.84  0.074 0.20  0.084  0.16 
ODA    -0.012 0.48  -0.004 0.14  -0.040 1.46  -0.049  1.60 
Interaction  +  0.063 1.39  0.063 1.24  0.144 2.16** 0.157  2.09** 
PCWAR  +  0.397 0.30  -0.208  0.11  0.124 0.13  -1.030 0.79 
ODA    0.282 3.80  0.261 3.27**  -0.005 0.19  -0.021 0.70 
Interaction  +  -0.061 3.87** -0.055 3.30** -0.025 2.74** -0.033  3.01** 
GOV3  +  0.575 4.76**  0.530 3.92**  0.309 3.08** 0.337  2.90** 
ODA    0.094 1.44  0.121 1.81*  -0.009 0.31  -0.018 0.60 
Interaction  +  -0.029 1.78*  -0.035 2.13** -0.031 2.24** -0.042  2.51** 
HONEST  +  0.443 2.85**  0.455 2.41**  0.315 2.04** 0.353  1.87* 
ODA    0.050 0.87  0.054 0.86  -0.018 0.69  -0.033 1.15 
Interaction  +  -0.020 0.92  -0.020 0.84  -0.034 2.18** -0.050  2.65** 
BUREAUC  +  0.318 1.64  0.391 1.78*  0.311 1.92*  0.395  2.09** 
ODA    0.132 2.76**  0.137 2.53**  -0.017 0.61  -0.028 0.95 
Interaction  +  -0.051 3.44** -0.052 3.01** -0.028 2.17** -0.038  2.43** 
LAW  +  0.562 3.61**  0.717 4.06**  0.333 2.15** 0.528  2.95** 
ODA    -0.017 0.65  -0.010 0.34  -0.054 1.92*  -0.069  2.09** 
Interaction  -  0.003 0.11  -0.009  0.29  0.011 0.80  0.015  0.97 
ASSAS  -  -0.044 0.34  -0.019 0.13  -0.034 0.34  -0.024  0.22 
ODA    -0.025 0.50  -0.049 0.85  -0.035 1.15  -0.069  1.97 
Interaction  -  0.013 0.18  0.063 0.74  -0.110 1.78** -0.055 0.73 
ETHNIC  -  -0.769 1.08  -1.334 1.68*  -0.052 0.73  -0.720  0.87 
ODA    0.016 0.36  0.040 0.72  -0.024 0.55  -0.027 0.57 
Interaction  -  0.160 0.54  -0.117  0.35  0.213 1.30  0.098  0.60 
COUPS  -  -2.128 1.65  -1.267 0.69  -2.986 3.01** -2.960  2.46** 
ODA    -0.008 0.22  0.016  0.35  -0.014 0.42  -0.021  0.57 
Interaction  -  0.075 1.34  0.043 0.71  0.039 0.55  0.022  0.33 
REV  -  -0.397 0.84  -0.833 1.41  -0.539 1.12  -1.319  2.02** 
ODA    -0.004 0.16  0.007  0.26  -0.032 1.19  -0.038  1.33 
Interaction  -  0.084 0.72  0.070 0.56  0.048 0.79  0.074  1.12 
PCONF  -  -1.149 1.69*  -1.674 2.07** -0.985 1.77*  -1.589  2.44** 
ODA    0.045 1.40  0.052 1.43  -0.034 1.22  -0.048 1.53 
Interaction  +  -0.011 2.23** -0.011 2.13** 0.000  0.06  -0.002  0.32 
DEMOC  +  0.099 1.87* 0.142 2.21**  0.027 0.49  0.051  0.76 
Notes: White heteroskedastic-consistent t-values are in parentheses. 
*       Significant at 10% level 
**     Significant at 5% level 
***   Significant at 1% level 
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Income  Variables 
Exp
. 
Sign  β  t  β  t  β  t  β  t 
ODA    -0.019 0.76  -0.042 1.63  -0.047 1.90*  -0.070  2.67** 
Interaction  -  -0.010 0.89  0.018  2.08** -0.014 0.73  0.011  0.38 
EXP_STAB  +  0.023 0.58  -0.123  3.58**  0.079 0.64  -0.128 0.72 
ODA    -0.015 0.65  -0.014 0.57  -0.048 1.96** -0.059  2.28** 




0.037 2.85**  0.039 1.55  0.027 3.05** 0.023  2.08** 
ODA    -0.158 1.51  -0.179 1.43  -0.026 0.98  -0.039  1.34 




-0.008 1.12  -0.007 0.85  -0.002 0.30  -0.003  0.39 
ODA    0.006 0.24  0.005 0.20  -0.039 1.40  -0.060 1.96** 
Interaction  -  0.446 1.21  0.339 0.89  -0.347 0.86  -0.500 1.18 
STABILITY  +  5.549 1.91* 5.857 1.82  5.756 1.98** 4.601  1.43 
ODA    -0.023 1.14  -0.008 0.35  -0.037 1.73  -0.031  1.27 
Interaction  +  1.190 0.92  0.116 0.11  1.484 1.00  -0.023 0.01 
PSHOCK  +  1.838 0.30  1.153 0.17  -1.614 0.39  -2.860 0.66 
ODA    -0.012 0.63  -0.005 0.23  -0.035 1.62  -0.028  1.14 
Interaction  +  -0.642 1.38  -0.896 1.36  -0.900 0.77  -1.295  0.99 
NSHOCK  -  -11.33 1.92*  -6.574 1.25  -6.892 0.88  0.309  0.04 
∆ODA    0.028 0.72  0.031 0.77  0.028 0.72  0.031  0.77 
Interaction  +  -1.819 0.69  -4.334 2.14** -1.819 0.69  -4.334  2.14** 
PSHOCK  +  1.711 0.30  -4.617  0.89  1.711 0.30  -4.617 0.89 
∆ODA    0.010 0.24  0.018 0.42  0.010 0.24  0.018  0.42 
Interaction  +  0.286 0.26  -0.942  0.79  0.286 0.26  -0.942 0.79 
NSHOCK  -  -14.15 2.78** -8.251 1.58  -14.15 2.78** -8.251  1.58 
 








Income  Variables 
Exp
. 
Sign  β  t  β  t  β  t  β  t 
ODA    0.117 1.68*  0.088  1.09  -0.004 0.13  -0.019 0.63 




-1.309 3.06**  -1.304  2.05**  -1.828  4.73**  -2.092  3.82** 
ODA    -0.014 0.36  -0.028  0.65  -0.028  0.90  -0.037  1.07 
Interaction  -  0.027 0.47  0.054  0.73  0.022  0.34  0.022  0.26 
TROPPOP  -  -2.266 4.13**  -2.365  3.36**  -2.161  3.78**  -2.034  2.65** 
ODA    -0.119 1.38  -0.188  1.90*  -0.016  0.49  -0.037  1.02 
Interaction  -  0.002 1.52  0.003  2.04** 0.000  0.49  0.000  0.27 
RURAL  -  -0.019 1.37  -0.046  2.46**  -0.016  1.13  -0.053  2.40** 
ODA    -0.035 1.04  -0.059  1.74*  -0.019  0.64  -0.027  0.86 
Interaction  -  0.074 1.39  0.121  1.96** -0.016 0.27  -0.025 0.31 
INLAND  -  -0.452 0.81  -0.492  0.72  0.353  0.63  0.807  1.11 
ODA    -0.119 1.36  -0.189  1.89*  -0.016  0.49  -0.037  1.03 
Interaction  -  0.005 1.49  0.008  2.02** -0.001 0.52  -0.001 0.30 
GEOIND  -  -0.061 1.47  -0.144  2.51**  -0.053  1.26  -0.168  2.49** 
ODA    -0.012 0.22  -0.040  0.64  -0.035  1.10  -0.046  1.35 
Interaction  -  0.016 0.26  0.053  0.80  0.018  0.37  0.073  1.29 
MALARIA  -  -0.938 1.74*  -0.915  1.35  -0.977  1.80*  -1.040  1.41   35
ODA    -0.040 1.05  -0.066  1.63  -0.045  1.50  -0.065  2.05** 
Interaction  ?  0.061 1.53  0.090  2.13** 0.065  1.09  0.080  1.26 
SSA  -  -1.065 1.88*  -1.162  1.89*  -1.258  1.77*  -1.218  1.57 
ODA    0.021 0.85  0.018  0.67  -0.032 1.20  -0.055 1.84* 
Interaction  ?  -0.104 2.87**  -0.124  3.17**  -0.090  1.85*  -0.133  2.48** 
LATAM  ?  1.339 3.04** 2.063  3.80** 0.930  2.15*  1.586  2.89** 
ODA    -0.001 0.06  -0.004  0.16  -0.031  1.14  -0.044  1.49 
Interaction  ?  0.145 1.21  0.007  0.03  -0.215 1.24  -0.249 1.28 
SASIA  ?  0.770 1.05  1.244  1.26  2.090  2.42** 2.074  1.83* 
ODA    -0.002 0.06  -0.009  0.34  -0.033  1.25  -0.050  1.72* 
Interaction  ?  0.470 1.35  0.682  1.97  -0.162 1.89*  -0.369 2.45** 
EASIA  +  -0.031 0.05  -0.142  0.19  0.574  1.25  0.994  1.66* 
ODA    0.047 0.78  0.079  1.27  -0.021 0.79  -0.039 1.34 
Interaction  +  -0.001 0.90  -0.001  1.51  -0.001  1.22  -0.001  1.42 
SCHOOL  +  0.008 0.84  0.016  1.27  0.007  0.99  0.012  1.25 
ODA    -0.530 3.23**  -0.716  3.90**  -0.015  0.50  -0.027  0.85 
Interaction  -  0.578 3.30***  0.775  3.96** -0.058 0.98  -0.096 1.35 
AGEDEP  -  -5.628 3.29**  -7.645  3.52**  -1.411  0.98  -2.517  1.38 
ODA    -0.057 1.11  -0.106  1.91*  -0.025  0.86  -0.044  1.42 
Interaction  -  0.001 1.53  0.001  2.36** 0.000  0.83  0.000  0.22 
INFMORT  -  -0.014 1.74  -0.019  1.96**  -0.011  1.23  -0.014  1.16 
ODA    -0.101 2.01**  -0.154  2.64**  -0.028  0.95  -0.051  1.65 
Interaction  -  0.002 2.53** 0.003  3.04** 0.001  0.66  0.001  0.74 
ILLIT  -  -0.045 4.16**  -0.064  4.65**  -0.034  2.92**  -0.051  3.45** 
Notes: White heteroskedastic-consistent t-values are in parentheses. 
*       Significant at 10% level 
**     Significant at 5% level 
***   Significant at 1% level   36
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1 Including the U.S., British, Dutch and Canadian aid agencies. 
2 Of course, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) are chiefly interested in constructing a critique of Burnside 
and Dollar rather than pursuing interactions with other exogenous factors. 
3 For example, the probability of receiving returns to investment may be a function of the quality of 
governance and social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1995), ethnic heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine, 
1997), the state of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), political stability (Perotti, 1996), climate and 
foreign demand (Masters and McMillan, 2000), government expenditure (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001) 
and openness to trade and investment (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999). 
4 For simplicity we let aid augment consumption one for one.  The prevalence of government 
corruption implies that this is unlikely to be the case.  Dalgaard et al., (2002) let a proportion of 
recipient governments’ aid receipts, π, be diverted away from consumer’s pockets.  Since we would 
expect π  to be a function of many of the same factors included in x, there is little reason to expect that 
modeling government leakages would change the broad implications of our model.  If xi, for example, 
increases π, we would generally expect it to increase p but also to complement aid in the “production” 
of a more favorable investment environment.  One would therefore xi to have two effects on the aid-
growth relationship, though these effects are expected to operate in the same direction.  
5 The existence of a saddle point stable steady state is guaranteed by assuming: 
0 <
= k k dc
k d &     
6 In essence, p constitutes a short run factor that is abstracted away within the long run neoclassical 
model.  However, the output model here should be seen as an expected output model in the ex ante 
sense, as in equation (4).  This output function is measured ex post and thus includes the ex ante 
influences of risk/uncertainty as well as the ex post actual rather than predicted risk/uncertainty factors. 
7 In practice, we have measures of GDP per capita rather than per worker, such that we approximate 
this relationship by assuming that the proportion of working age people is roughly constant over time. 
8 Abstracting from depreciation rates can be motivated be either assuming rates are equal across 
countries, or that the variation in rates is captured by other factors in the growth equation, as described 
in the next section.  In particular, one would reasonably hypothesize that depreciation rates would vary 
positively with measures of geographical disadvantage, particularly the proportion of land in the 
tropics. 
9 Using GDP in the denominator can also indirectly capture the growth in the labor force (that is, 
growth in the economically productive population), rather than mere general population growth.   
10 Furthermore, a more sophisticated model might need to allow for A to be a function of p.  Also, 
despite the inability to delineate variables as determining either growth in p or growth in A, we believe 
that this is a highly intuitive and more transparent means of conceptualizing TFP that the standard risk-
free neoclassical model.  For example, our model suggests that even two countries with the same inputs 
and levels of technology need not grow at the same rate if the probability of receiving returns to 
investment varies significantly (see Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992, for a similar discussion of 
expropriation risk). 
11 Though FDI levels may influence aid flows, it seems safe, for the moment at least, to assume that 
private foreign investors are not directly influenced by the level of foreign aid in which a country 
receives.  They are, however, high influenced by the risk within a country.   
12 A third could foreign direct investment flows.  Though this turns out to be an important variable in 
lieu of our final results, allowing for the endogeneity of FDI is beyond the scope of the present study.   
13 Burnside and Dollar (2000), for example, conclude that where aid has been diverted to government 
consumption it has been ineffective.  These sorts of conclusion require qualification, however.  First, 
not all government consumption need be thought of as unproductive, especially insofar as governments 
finance current education and health expenditure.  Second, in relation to point one, growth regressions 
of this type do not typically control for the dynamic relationship between aid and growth.  Morrissey 
(2001), for example, has estimated that perhaps only a third of foreign aid is directed towards 
increasing growth in the medium term. 
14 Strictly speaking, a non-linear simultaneous equations regressor should be employed. 
15 In an earlier version of this paper we employed yearly data as one of several other robustness checks 
which are described below.  Most of the results were insignificant with a greater frequency, with the   39
                                                                                                                                            
exception of the war variables, suggesting that averaging these variables is in fact disadvantageous as 
they vary intertemporally a great deal.   
16 We have used the term policy measures in an admittedly ambiguous sense.  Many authors (see 
Lensink and White (2001) for example) have drawn attention to the fact that at least one of Burnside 
and Dollar’s three policy indicators - the inflation rate - is actually a measure of policy 
outcomes/targets, rather than the underlying policy instrument itself.   
17 There are several controversies in the EDA construction.  Most troublingly, the title Effective 
Development Assistance is perhaps quite misleading.  As Dalgaard et al., (2002) point out, there are not 
necessarily strong a priori grounds to think that a 10 million dollar loan is less growth-effective than a 
10 million dollar grant.  The relative productivity of loans surely depends on a multitude of factors, not 
least political factors. 
18 It has generally been argued that this method of index construction is possibly highly sensitive to 
model specification issues and dependent on the assumption that policies matter for growth in the same 
way that they do for aid effectiveness (see Lensink and White, 2000, and White, 2001)
18.  There has 
been less emphasis, however, on the dubious procedure of combining a binary variable (OPEN) with 
two continuous variables.   
19 The budget deficit component of the good policy index, for example, suffers from both greater 
paucity and possible self selection issues if non-reporting countries run, on average, higher budget 
deficits. 
20 In fact, we ran a multitude of variations (e.g. low income 2SLS).  Space constraints inhibit our ability 
to report these, though they are available on request.   
21 Also known as the minimum absolute deviations (MAD), least absolute values (LAV) or the L1 
estimator.  We employed the Bofinger-Siddiqui method for computing the differential used when 
selecting ordered residuals. 
22 Despite this, we are skeptical of any claims that the empirical regularity of this result is much proof 
of its validity when researchers almost inevitably employ very similar data sets.  Indeed, we feel that 
there have been relatively few efforts to derive alternative measures of aid.  In that regard, the efforts 
by Cheng et al., (1998) were welcome indeed. 
23 Burnside and Dollar could argue that their use of the assassinations and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index capture the propensity for conflict, however the latter variable is time-invariant 
and very indirect, while the assassinations variable can, on occasion completely fail to capture the 
incidence of conflict.  Despite 20 years of often intense civil war in Mozambique, for example, the 
assassinations variable scores zero for the entire period of our analysis, with the exception of the last 
period in which the country grew at average rate of 6.6%, one of the highest in Africa. 
24 These variables are assassinations, ETHNIC, M2/GDP, and BLACK. 
25 All results are available on request.   
26 We are reluctant to increase the stringency of this decision rule on the grounds that a particular 
condition may fail to hold, for example, in the low income sample, particularly if the variation in the 
condition is a function of income.  Likewise, there is very little means of ascertaining whether OLS or 
2SLS is the preferred regressor.   
27 Hudson and Mosley (2002) also used the arms expenditure measure in their regressions, but appear 
not to have interacted aid with arms imports, choosing instead to employ this as a control variable only. 
28 Likewise, interactions with the SSA dummy variable are marginally insignificant and positive in 
several variations.  This result may also account for several of the questionable results eliminated in 
Table 2, since variations in geographic and demographic factors tend to be highly explained by 
continental variations. 
29 A 2SLS regressor cannot easily be applied to a principal components specification because the fitted 
values of aid will inevitably be highly correlated with the variables contained in the principal 
components.  Thus an artificially induced multicollinearity between aid and the principal components 
leads to low t-values for aid and aid-interaction terms.   
30 The insignificance of ∆WAR on growth is also a troubling result, even though this variable was 
marginally insignificant in our base regression for the full sample of countries.  It suggests that war 
only has a detrimental effect on growth when accompanied by foreign aid, or, conversely, that there are 
no supra-returns to peace without foreign aid (also found by Collier and Hoeffler, 2002).  The latter 
result is tolerable, the former not so. 
31 The implications on optimal aid allocation of the Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) and Collier and 
Dollar (2002) findings were controversial precisely because they relied on a whole host of questionable 
assumptions about the nebulous causal relationships between aid, policy and growth.  The causal 
dimensions of our own findings are understandably far more complex.  See section IV.   40
                                                                                                                                            
32 For example, we did not employ additional quadratic terms, such as aid-squared, in conjunction with 
interaction terms because this quadratic term was insignificant when entered individually (see Table 2).   
Regarding alternative aid measures we refer the reader to Section III.  Relevant to this is our ability to 
test donor-side considerations as per Lensink and Morrisey (1999) due to the paucity of data in this 
regard: for example, data on the tying of aid for specific recipients is not widely available. 
33 Researchers at PRIO have generated rather crude measures of the geographical coverage of wars, 
such as the war radius as defined by discrete blocks of 50 square kilometers.  We tested these measures 
also by scaling the war radius according to arable land size, but this measure did not generate 
significant results in terms of determining either growth or aid effectiveness.  More refinement of these 
measures would certainly be desirable. 
34 It is theoretically questionable whether long-run terms of trade movements are of the greatest 
interest, however, when short-run volatility in price movements, as emphasised by Collier and Dehn 
(2001), are probably of greater relevance when considering whether aid acts as insurance.   
35 We are grateful to Howard White for this particular reference.  Bauer (1974) also considered the 
dynamic interaction between aid and FDI, in fact arguing that the only economic justification for 
foreign aid was its ability to stabilize the investment environment and thereby promote private sector 
development.  Bauer, rather anecdotally, concluded that the only case in which aid had been effectively 
used in this capacity was in Taiwan.  More empirically, this is an issue ably addressed by Clemens 
(2002) with respect to foreign aid from the World Bank. 